








Martin Buber and Muhammad Husain Tabatabaei: 




In this paper, I want to compere some of the ideas of Martin Buber, a distinguished 
existential philosopher, with Muhammad Husain Tabatabaei, one of the significant 
figures of contemporary philosophy and Sufism in Shia Islam. In the first section, I 
shall briefly introduce these two important philosophers and in the second part, I 
will consider the relationship between God and the creatures form their point of 
view. In this section I will show that there is a similarity between Buber’s 
conception of “I-Thou” with Tabatabaei’s view on “I” as the only way toward 
reality. In section three, I will compare their perspectives towards good and evil. In 
the fourth section, I will explain Tabatabaei’s novel argument for an eternal reality 
and I will show that how it is similar to Buber’s Eternal Thou. 
 





1.1 Martin Buber 
Martin Buber (1878-1965) a prominent Jewish philosopher, religious thinker and 
political activist, was born in Austria and spent most of his life in Israel and 
Germany. Most of his works are written in German and Hebrew and includes a 
variety of different fields, form Mysticism to biblical studies. He was the professor 
at the university of Frankfurt before the time that Adolf Hitler takes the power in 
1933. He then went to Israel and was the professor at Hebrew University till his 
death in 1965. (Scott, Martin Buber in IEP)  
Buber was a cultural Zionist who was disagreed with Herzl’s political and cultural 
approach toward Zionism. He emphasized on the cultural and spiritual aspects of 
Judaism and not just on the Jewish nation. Some of his major works are as follows: 
I and Thou (1923), Between Man and Man (1920s), The Knowledge of Man 
(1952). Buber named himself a philosophical anthropologist. (Zank, 2014, SEP) 
 
1.2 Muhammad Husain Tabatabaei 
Muhammad Husain Tabatabaei (1904/1981) was one of the most influential 
Islamic thinkers in contemporary era. He was born in Tabriz, Iran and spent most 
of his life in Iraq (Najaf) and Iran (Qom). He was a Sadraian philosopher (the 
followers of Mulla Sadra)2 and Shia Mystic. He has written many books in 
Philosophy, Sufism and mysticism, theology, Quran exegesis and Islamic 
jurisprudence. Some of his major books are as follows. 
 
2. For more information on Mulla Sadra, see: Afroogh 2012 and Afroogh 2015.  
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- Al-Mizan fi tafsir al-Qur'an (exegesis of Quran) 
- Gloss on al-Asfar (interpretation of Mulla Sadra’s major book al-Asfar) 
- Risalah Al- Wilayah (in mysticism) 
 
He was one of the most important figures in contemporary Shia thought especially 
in Iran. He was influenced by Mulla Sadra (in philosophy) and Ibn Arabi (in 
mysticism).  
There are three main approaches in Islamic philosophy; the first is Peripatetic 
philosophy (the followers of Aristotle in Islamic world) which is established by 
Avicenna. The second is Illuminationism philosophy by Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi, 
and the third is Transcendental philosophy founded by Mulla Sadra. Mulla Sadra 
was the last comprehensive philosopher in Islamic world and some of his followers 
(such as Tabatabaei) have inclined to Sufism specially Ibn Arabi’s thoughts. 3 
 
II 
The Relationship between God and Creatures 
 
2.1. Buber’s perspective 
 
3. You will find on Mulla Sadra’s works in the followings (M. ‘Abd al-Haq 1970; 





Martin Buber’s I and thou is about two important relations: I-Thou and I-It. The 
former refers to the relation between man and other in a dialog. In this relationship, 
you know others not through some universal categories or definition. In contrast, 
the I-It refers to a monolog state. In this relation you classify things based on the 
differences between them and some universal definition. You can face with these 
objects and predicate their changes. (Scott, Martin Buber in IEP) 
“The “I” of man differs in both modes of existence. The “I” may be taken as the 
sum of its inherent attributes and acts, or it may be taken as a unitary, whole, 
irreducible being. The “I” of the “I-It” relation is a self-enclosed, solitary 
individual (der Einzige) that takes itself as the subject of experience. The “I” of the 
“I-Thou” relation is a whole, focused, single person (der Einzelne) that knows 
itself as subject. In later writings Buber clarified that inner life is not exhausted by 
these two modes of being. However, when man presents himself to the world he 
takes up one of them.” (Scott, Martin Buber in IEP) 
Buber states that there are three kinds of dialogue i.e. “I-Thou”: dialogue with 
man, dialogue with nature and dialogue with spirit. He offers Socrates as a 
prominent figure for dialogue with man and Goethe as a major figure for dialog 
with nature, and Jesus as paramount figure for dialogue with spirit. (Scott, Martin 
Buber in IEP) 
Dialogue with man is the clearest one in this regard, and as we see in Socrates, it is 
one of the best ways toward reality. Actually through dialogue we can see how to 




Dialogue with spirit is the most important one for Buber. He consider it as the 
dialogue with the Eternal Thou which is eternally other and sometimes he called it 
God.  
Buber consider I-Thou relation as the most important one in human beings life 
which basically form our social and cultural aspects of life. He emphasizes that if 
we want to reach to our social and spiritual goals we should concentrate on these 
relationships with others.  
It seems that Buber’s I-Thou is mind dependent and through this we can have such 
relation even with the stranger persons and others. 
As you see, the notion of “I” and the dialog with “eternal Thou” or “eternal other” 
play central roles in Buber’s interpretation of the world. In what follows I will 
elaborate on these two notion form Tabatabaei’s point of view. 
 
2.2 Tabatabaei’s view on “I” 
“Who am i?” is one of the most important questions in Islamic Mysticism. Many of 
the Islamic mystics and Sufis try to give an appropriate answer to this question. 
Besides the different theoretical answers, Sufis try to give some practical exercises 
and meditations for comprehending the reality of self. Even though, some of them 
have tried to describe their intuitional comprehension of “I” in a theoretical 
philosophy. One of the most successful people in this regard is Tabatabaei who are 
both practicing Sufi and theoretical philosopher, and actually because of this his 
works are very important for Islamic scholars. He has tried to formulate Sufi’s 
knowledge in terms of philosophical tools.  
6 
 
According to Tabatabei, to answer of the question “who am I?” we need some 
more fundamental concepts about the nature of objects in the world.  
Tabatabaei, in correspond to Mulla Sadar, believe that there is nothing in the world 
but pure and Absolut existence, and actually because of the fact we call the objects 
in the world as existents. However, there is a difference between Absolut existence 
and existents. The former, as opposed to the latter, don’t have any identitis and 
shapes. He wants to state that in reality we have just Absolut existence and it is our 
mind which put this in different shapes and forms. All objects or existents have 
two dimensions: the first is their reality which is Absolut existence, and the other is 
their identity, shape, face or appearance. So, there is no any difference between 
wood and stone and human beings in the reality and in their being existence; the 
only difference is in their identities and shapes which is partially constructed by 
our minds.  
He explains that these differences by shapes are necessary for our living in this 
world. For without these differences we cannot know and identify different objects 
and we cannot know ourselves. However, he calls such knowledge as appearance 
knowledge as opposed to real knowledge. He insists that for having real 
knowledge we should go through another way. Mind is a way toward different 
existents and identities in the world not pure and Absolut existence in the reality. 
He says this new way toward our reality is “I”. Every person has a very intuitional, 
subjective and existential way toward reality and it is their selves. He defines “I” as 
a simple existence which is the entrance of the Absolut existence, which can cover 
all the others. 
So it seems to me that his definition of “I” is very similar to “I” in “I-Thou” in 
Buber’s philosophy. On one hand, Buber says that through I-Thou we can have the 
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relation even with the stranger persons and others; on the other hand, Tabatabaei 
believes that “I” is our only way toward “Absolut existence” which covers all the 
existents including strangers and others. Seemingly, both of them believe that we 
can have a better understanding of the universe through our “I”. However, it seems 





2.3 Tabatabaei’s view on “eternal other” 
Buber in the third kind of  I-Thou states that Jesus is the ideal type of this relation 
and he call God with the world “eternal Thou” which is eternally other.  
It seems to me that there is a very similar relationship between Buber’s “eternal 
Thou” and Tabatabei’s conception of “absolute reality”. 
Tabatabaei defines “absolute reality” as follows: 
“ هنم ءیشب سیل و ءایشالا لک هقیقحلا طیسب ” 
It means that “the Absolut reality or the pure existence is all the existents without 
their shapes and identities.”   
He state that the reality of all the things is the same and it is who walks or runs, 
drinks or eats, gives or takes, sits and stands. All the power and beauties are 
originated in it. All the goods are comes from it. But all the evil are from shapes 
and identities.   
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He defines God as the reality who can be proving by mind but can be grasped just 
through “I” by heart.  
From Tabatabaei’s point of view, the real relationship between “I” and “God” is an 
existential relation and he believes that there is no way for knowing an “Absolut 
existence” from a nonexistence and conceptual way. Our mind at most can prove 
some theoretical concepts which describe God. 
It seems that this way of grasping the reality is very close to something which 
Buber says about the dialog between “I” and the “eternal other”. However, I think 
there are some differences between them. Why Buber describe God by the notion 
of “other”? It seems that we can answer to this question from Tabatabaei’s 
viewpoint. 
According to Tabatabaei, making theoretical differences between things and 
objects are necessary for human knowledge. But he considers this kind of 
knowledge as theoretical and appearance knowledge not real knowledge. In 
theoretical knowledge, using our mind, we identify a verity of objects and we 
consider them as others; something other than ourselves. And in this project, God 
is the strangest things for us especially by comparison to the other strangers. It 
seems that because of the fact, for Buber, God is considered as the eternal other.  
Moreover, Tabatabi has a novel proof for an eternal and absolute reality which I 
will elaborate on it in the section IV.  It seems that his conception of “eternal 







Good and Evil 
3.1 Buber on good and evil 
Buber in the book Good and Evil tries to define good and evil based on the 
possibility and actualization. From his point of view, we can say that: 
“Evil is a formless, chaotic swirling of potentiality; in the life of man it is 
experienced as endless possibility pulling in all directions. Good is that which 
forms and determines this possibility, limiting it into a particular direction. We 
manifest the good to the extent we become a singular being with a singular 
direction.” (Scott, Martin Buber in IEP) 
Buber clarifies that our imagination contains both good and evil. And there are 
both possibilities in it; however, it becomes evil when it diverges from direction. 
Our task is not to try to eliminate evil, but we just should try to reunite it again 
with good to become a whole good. He calcifies evil to two stages. The first is sin 
and the other is wickedness. He says that because of the possibilities of evil, one 
cannot always be good. It is a continues effort for being good and trying to balance 
good and evil. (Scott, Martin Buber in IEP) 
Furthermore, he states that evil is originally nonexistence and insubstantial. He 
explains that we don’t have any essential and whole evil; it just comes up from an 
inner contradiction.  
 
3.2 Tabatabaei on good and evil 
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Tabatabaei’s view on good and evil is very similar to Buber’s. According to 
Tabatabaei all the goods are originated from God and all the evil coms up form 
creature’s identities. He says that pure and absolute existence is good in itself; this 
is our constructive identities and the contradiction between them which cause some 
evil in the world.  
In other words, he says that we don’t have any absolute evil in the world. For all 
the world is formed form Absolut existence and it is completely good. All the 
apparent evils that we see in the world are relative evil not absolute evil. Here, he 
divides evil to two kinds: 
- Absolut evil which refers to the evil in reality, and because Tabatabaei 
believes that the reality and the existence are equivalent with good, it 
concludes that absolute evil is nonexistence. So, we don’t have any absolute 
evil in the world. 
- Relative evil which refer to some constructive evil in our mind which comes 
from some contradiction in the world. It means that many of the apparent 
evil stuffs or pains in the world is bad and unfavorable for us, not for the 
entire universe. So, he states that a wise man should be content of such evil 
and know that all of these pains have some roots in a whole good system.  
As we see, there is a similarity between Buber and Tabatabei. Both of them see 
evil as nonexistence.  
 
IV 
Buber’s “eternal other” and Tabatabaei’s proof for the “eternal reality” 
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Buber refers to God as “eternal other” and he explains how “I-thou” relation helps 
us to understand God. As I explained in section 2.2, it seems that his conception of 
“eternal God” is very similar to Tabatabaei’s conception of “eternal reality”. 
Tabatabei in his glosses on the book Asfar (by Mulla Sadra), presents a novel 
argument for the existence of God which is very similar to the Ontological 
arguments in the western theology. Through this argument he proves an “eternal 
reality”. His argument is as follows: 
 
“The Existence is an objective truth.” (Mulla Sarda, 1966, Vol. 6, p. 12) 
―and this objective truth is the very reality which based on it, we deny sophism 
and find that every reasonable individual inevitably accepts it. This reality is one 
that cannot adopt inexistency and nullity in its essence. Even the supposition of the 
inexistency and nullity of reality itself necessitates its existence. [To explain what 
is meant,] If we suppose that all realities are invalid and inexistent in a particular 
time or always, this means that in reality, all realities are inexistent (and this in turn 
will prove the existence of a reality again). Likewise, if the sophist assumes that all 
things are illusionary, or doubts in their reality, indeed, in his view, those things 
are really illusionary and their realities are really dubitable (this means that reality 
is proven from the very point it was rejected), while reality in essence, cannot 
adopt any inexistency and nullity, resulting in its necessity in itself. Therefore, 
there is a reality that is necessary in itself that makes other things that are real, 
dependent on it in their reality and existence. It is from this that the thinker finds 
that the existence of a necessary being is obvious for everyone and the proofs for 
the existence of the necessary are actually nothing but reminders.” (Tabatabaei, 




Tabatabei begins with an axiomatic concept (i.e. existence and the proposition that 
“there is a reality). In the second step, he concludes by redaction ad absurdum, that 
reality is necessary and it is such that it is impossible for it to be inexistent. He 
concludes that there is an “eternal reality”, and it is very similar to Buber’s 




To sum it up, with all the aforementioned arguments taken into account, I think 
there are some important similarities between Buber’s theology and Tabatabei’s 
religious philosophy. The similarities between their definition of “I”, “eternal God” 
and the nature of good and evil simply reviled that their ideas are representing the 
same facts. It seems to me that this similarities between the ideas of two thinkers 
who are born and raised in two completely different contexts is a good 
confirmation for their common ideas. 
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